Proposal - towards Linea’s decentralization

Protocol Design
143

Seem interesting

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i think its good

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Apply strict sybil filter during the linea park campaign where almost 600k+ new wallets added from industrial farmers. and make minimum 2000 LXP holdings with other criteria.

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IDK, what about 2k minimum, but I definitely agree that we need strong filters for new wallets and Linea Park only participants

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The entry threshold of 2000 seems too tough for those guys who started in the Park and continued to do other activities, the cultural season and side events. I think this point should also be taken into account

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  1. Using VRF/Verifiable Random Function.
    The text mentions a “random selection” of subcommittees, and randomness mechanisms always require details. I suggest using reliable pseudorandom functions (VRF), similar to what is implemented in certain PoS protocols (e.g., Algorand, Cardano, etc.).
    This will ensure a fair and verifiable selection of the subcommittee without the possibility of manipulation.

  2. Flexible adaptation of the subcommittee size.
    If the total stake in L2 grows, it may be reasonable to dynamically revise the number of validators in the subcommittee. An excessively small subcommittee can be more centralized, while one that is too large will reduce throughput (creating overhead in QBFT).

  3. More nuanced slashing conditions.
    The text mentions that proof of misconduct (a discard message) leads to slashing a validator. It may be worthwhile to clarify and detail the scale of violations—for example, distinguishing minor offenses (failing to vote) from serious ones (proposing an invalid block, double signing, etc.)—and penalize proportionally.

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149

Dude, at least read the text that chatgpt generates for you before you publish it. We exchange our opinions and reasoning here, not the opinions of artificial intelligence.

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Where exactly am I wrong?

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Thank you for taking the time to read and comment on the proposal. For the randomness, yes it’ll require some more details. VRF are indeed a good option. We’ll also see how to leverage some pseudo randomness from L1 randao.

Regarding your point 2, there are some recent proposal for the L1 that we want to further look at. In its simpler form, the committee has a fix size and each validator a minimum stake.

for 3, failing to vote is not slashable but leads to no reward. We can’t prove it for sure. Slashing are for offense that are provable without ambiguities, offense that could lead to fork.

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